Regionalising the Common Fisheries Policy: context, content and controversy by David Symes
Symes Maritime Studies 2012, 11:6
http://www.maritimestudiesjournal.com/content/11/1/6RESEARCH Open AccessRegionalising the Common Fisheries Policy:
context, content and controversy
David SymesCorrespondence: dg@dgsymes.
karoo.co.uk
University of Hull, Hull, UK©
L
pAbstract
The European Union (EU) has been slow to recognise the benefits of regionalising
the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and even now the Commission's advocacy
appears to lack the assuredness of conviction. To understand this reluctant
conversion, the paper explains how increasing pressures for radical reform -
enlargement, increasing diversity, expanding scope, budgetary pressures, the quest
for good governance and an awareness of the CFP as a failing system – have
encountered powerful forces for conservatism both within the legal structures of the
EU and the development of the CFP itself which discourage transformational change.
The paper traces the history of regionalisation up to its inclusion in the 2012 reform
agenda and explores alternative forms of regionalising EU fisheries management and
some of the key issues surrounding the successful completion of the project.
Regionalising the CFP is seen not as an end in itself but as a means of repairing its
damaged reputation and securing the effective delivery of the Policy's objectives.
Introduction
The European Union's Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) presently faces the most import-
ant challenge of its thirty year history. Can it bring about the measure of change needed
to secure the foundations for sustainable fisheries, guarantee long term viability for
Europe's fishing industries and fisheries dependent regions and redeem its seriously
damaged reputation among fishermen , while remaining true to the principles, aims and
norms of the wider European project? To do so it will need to break with its previous
history of incremental path dependent change, challenge some of the deeply embedded
assumptions concerning fisheries policy and embrace fundamental, transformational
reforms.
The complex physical and political geographies of the European seas dictate the
continuing need for a coherent approach to the management of fish stocks that are shared
among many coastal states. Future policy must set out the common aims and objectives,
the underlying principles and a broad, overarching strategy for sustainable management
of the living resources of the sea. But it must also make provision for the transfer of
responsibility for much of the detailed management to the regions, partly to relieve central
management of some of the burden of micromanaging the fisheries but also to bring deci-
sion making closer to those most directly affected and with the knowledge and experience
of specific fisheries. This is not a simple task. Regionalising the CFP, through a geograph-
ical framework synonymous with the major marine ecosystems of the European seas, is2012 Symes; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
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framework for decision making, but it should also provide an effective mechanism for
delivering other elements of the reform package.
The aim of the paper is to explore the rationale behind proposals for regionalising the
CFP, commenting not only on the pressures that have helped to build the momentum for
reform but also on some of the deeply embedded conventions of policy making that make
regionalisation a contentious issue. It begins by describing the origins of regionalisation in
twentieth century geographical thought and the circumstances in the latter part of the cen-
tury that provided the impetus for applying this idea to fisheries management. The second
part of the paper traces the idea of regionalising the CFP as an intellectual concept and a
pragmatic solution to the problems facing EU fisheries at the start of the twenty-first cen-
tury. Finally, the unresolved organisational, political and 'constitutional' issues that may
still inhibit its adoption are examined. The scope of the paper has deliberately been kept as
broad as possible in the hope that it will not only furnish a robust narrative in support of
the argument for regionalisation but also provide a useful context for the papers that
follow.
Regions, regionalism and regionalisation
The idea of the region – 'an area considered as a unit for geographical, functional or
cultural reasons' (Collins, 1986) – as an important organisational framework for
human activity came to prominence with the influential French school of geography
led by Paul Vidal de la Blache, Jean Bruhnes and Lucien Febvre in the early years of the
twentieth century. Physiographic or 'formal' regions were identified on widely differing
geographical scales ranging from world regions used to denote large tracts of land with
broadly similar climate or vegetation characteristics to very much smaller areas such
as the French pays, often imbued with 'personality' and associated with distinctive
landscapes and traditional agrarian cultures. Later the term 'functional region' was
used to describe areas unified through a particular administrative or management
function such as local government, water catchment management, health administra-
tion or economic planning.
In the context of fisheries and their management, regions can be both formal and
functional: formal in the sense that that the region may describe a particular marine
ecosystem and be neatly delineated by a well defined sea basin, and also functional in
that it may be designated as an administrative unit for the purpose of managing the use
of living resources of the sea.
Boundaries have frequently proved a contentious issue whether applied to the defin-
ition of formal or functional regions. But whereas in terrestrial space a line may be
drawn and vested with meaning – albeit possibly contested and maybe temporary – this
is rarely the case in marine space where boundaries tend to be quite literally fluid.
Europe's complex, irregular and fragmented coastal morphology comes to the aid of
region building. Sea basins – the Baltic and North Seas in the north and west of Europe
and the Mediterranean and Black Seas to the south and east – are naturally defined
regions, almost but not quite self-contained and distinguished from the neighbouring
seas by ecosystem characteristics. By contrast, Europe's Atlantic front lacks any easily
identifiable boundaries and use has to be made of the somewhat arbitrary ICES rectan-
gles and the 200 mile limits in order to separate north western from south western waters.
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example, exhibits significant north–south variations in salinity and water temperature
which translate into different ecosystem characteristics and distinctive fisheries.
Of crucial importance to the efficacy of functional regions is their legal status. On
land most administrative regions are statutory designations whose boundaries, functions
and powers are clearly defined in law and which are therefore accorded full recognition
by the state. When it comes to maritime regions their status is often much less clear,
due largely to issues of national sovereignty and communal or individual use rights.
Since the mid-1970s, freedom of the high seas has been constrained by the near univer-
sal declaration of 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) which reserve the rights
for fishing and the exploration and development of mineral resources to the coastal
state. Sea fisheries were widely deemed to be subject to common use rights with the
state assuming a duty of care and responsibility for their management.
In the case of the EU the situation is still further complicated. For purposes of fisher-
ies management and exploitation, the EEZs of all coastal member states were merged to
form a single EU fishing zone, sometimes referred to as the 'common pond', to be man-
aged centrally through a common fisheries policy and with nominal freedom of access
granted to all member states' fishing vessels, though in practice access is restricted to
those member states with appropriate quota entitlements based on historic fishing
rights. Further restrictions were imposed through a derogation in respect of inshore
waters. An inner zero-six nautical mile zone was reserved for the exclusive use of the
coastal state and access to an outer six-twelve nautical mile zone was permitted only to
vessels from member states with historic access agreements.
Rather more problematic in the context of regionalising the CFP is the fact that the
European Treaties governing the conduct of EU policy making fail to recognise regions
as part of the executive process. The EU is made up of the European institutions (the
Commission, Council of Ministers, European Parliament and European Court of Justice)
and the member states. Only these institutions have a mandate to act in the formulation
and implementation of policy. Where regions do have a role to play in EU policy mak-
ing it is only in an advisory capacity, as with the Committee of the Regions. A regional
management organisation for the Baltic or North Sea, for example, having an inter-
national identity, drawing on the collaboration of several member states and exercising
decision making powers would be ultra vires.
Whereas the region may be considered a fairly neutral concept, regionalism – defined
as 'the division of a country into administrative regions having partial autonomy; the
advocacy of such divisions' (Collins, 1986) – is a more loaded term. Strongly associated
with territoriality, it carries a sense of occupation, ownership and jurisdiction which, in
the context of marine space, implies questions of third party access. Regionalism has
also become a synonym for countervailing forces acting in opposition to those emanat-
ing from the centre and for separatist movements striving for greater autonomy or for
secession. It is closely bound up with core:periphery relations and the concept of
'internal colonialism' (Hechter, 1975); geographically, Europe's fisheries dependent
regions are by definition part of the periphery. The western and southern margins of
the EU in many instances suffer a degree of economic deprivation, the outward flow of
population and resources, high rates of unemployment and low levels of income. They
are also remote from the economic core and the political centre of the EU. In recent
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under the EU's Cohesion Programme and there seems little risk of secessionist tenden-
cies developing in the coastal periphery.
In general, devolution and the granting of greater autonomy to the regions can be seen
as a means whereby the state is able to further democratise decision making while retain-
ing hegemony over all its territory (Stacey, 2001). In the case of the United Kingdom, for
example, devolving powers to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland was regarded as a
means of maintaining the Union rather than destroying it (Bogdanor, 1999). Devolved
government can provide not only a more efficient delivery system for policy but also
enhance local democracy and create a more solid basis of legitimacy for the actions of the
state.
Regionalisation is a term not recognised in Collins English Dictionary. Its meaning,
however, can be inferred from common usage as the process of decentralising through
the transfer of significant areas of decision making from central government institutions
to the regions. For regionalisation to add value to the system of governance, it must not
be limited to bureaucratic decentralisation involving the relocation of central govern-
ment's decision making apparatus to regional offices. Some element of devolved respon-
sibility is necessary.
What constitutes the process of regionalising the CFP should become clear as the ar-
gument unfolds. Its purpose should, however, be made clear from the start. The aim is
to achieve an improved, more democratic and effective management of the use of living
resources of the sea on a sustainable basis, with the economic and social benefits
enjoyed by society as a whole through increased food security and by the coastal regions
in particular in the form of greater viability of the fishing industries and enhanced
employment opportunities and living standards for the coastal communities.
Pressures for reform of the common fisheries policy
Enlargement
For much of its relatively short life the CFP has suffered the familiar confrontation be-
tween the irresistible forces of change, largely stimulated by external circumstances, and
the immovable objects of structural rigidity and ingrained norms of behaviour. Since its
inception in the early 1970s the CFP has expanded hugely in terms of geographical jur-
isdiction, diversity of fisheries and complexity of governance. At the time when the
underlying precept of non-discrimination was first applied to fisheries in the shape of
equal access – and later after 1976 when the details of the common policy for the con-
servation of fish stocks in the EU's fishing zone were being negotiated – the common
pond was limited in size. What was in effect being negotiated was a regional policy for
the prolific mixed fisheries of the North Sea which overlapped into the southern Baltic,
Irish Sea and northwest waters.a
Successive phases of expansion of membership in the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and early
years of the twenty-first century added considerably to the geographical area of the EU's
exclusive fishing zone and to the diversity of species to be managed.b However, except
for the enlargements in the 1970s (Denmark, Ireland and the UK) and 1980s (Spain,
Portugal and Greece) the expansion in area was not matched by a proportionate
increase in the level of natural resources or the size of the fishing industry. By 2010 the
common pond had grown from a single regional sea to an area stretching through forty
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waters around the Canary Islands, and through sixty degrees of longitude from the
Azores to the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea (Sissenwine and Symes, 2007).
Both the North and Baltic Seas had become almost, but not quite, exclusively EU
waters, together with the Atlantic front of Europe from Shetland to the Straits of
Gibraltar, with significant outliers in the Atlantic attributable to the Azores and Canary
Islands. Only in the Mediterranean and Black Seas was the idea of a common pond
diluted by a greater number of non-EU coastal states and by the truncated continental
shelf and restriction of the exclusive fishing zone to fifty nautical miles. Looking to the
foreseeable future, only the accession of Turkey and the remoter possibilities of Iceland,
Norway or Russia joining the EU would add substantially to the size and significance of
the common pond.
Over the thirty years from 1982 to 2012 the EU has witnessed a significant increase in
the number of species and stocks at risk from overexploitation and, therefore, brought
within the remit of the CFP. At the time of the inauguration of the conservation policy
there were ten quota regulated species in the European zone, though a number of
others were subject to 'precautionary total allowable catches (TACs)' setting global lim-
its to the EU catch but no national quota. By 2012 the number of quota regulated spe-
cies had risen to thirty-four. Over the same period, quota regulated species in the North
Sea had more than trebled from eight to twenty-nine reflecting, at least in part, the dee-
pening crisis of the region's fisheries following the collapse of the gadoid outburst of the
1970s.
Complex decision making
Conservation of fish stocks and their sustainable use formed the cornerstones of the
CFP. Preparations for the annual review of TACs, including negotiations within the
North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) concerning herring and mackerel
and with Norway over the allocation of North Sea TACs, provided a particular focus for
the Commission's activities, along with the monitoring and review of technical conser-
vation measures (minimum landing sizes, gear regulations and closed areas). As the
Commission's Directorate General (DG) responsible for the CFP, DG Fisheries' work-
load was further increased, along with the costs of administering the CFP, as a result of
broadening the management role to include fleet capacity under the Multi-annual Guid-
ance Programmes (1984–2002) and more recently the introduction of long term recov-
ery and management plans and effort control measures – all intended to buttress the
failing conservation policy. By the early years of the twenty-first century, DG Mare, as
successor to DG Fisheries, had become embroiled in the micromanagement of fisheries
in one of the world's largest and most complex fishing zones.
Enlargement also meant an increase in the number of seats on the Fisheries Council
from nine in 1982 to twenty-seven in 2007 with a growing proportion occupied by
member states with little or no marine fishing interests. The potential for alliances and
blocking minorities to be formed within the Council was increased, as was the 'horse
trading' during the critical December Council meeting dealing with the annual review
of TACs, leading to compromises rather than effective decision making to tackle the
fundamental problems facing the fishing industry. In one sense, the unique constitu-
tional arrangements for decision making in respect of the CFP, with the Commission
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and the Council of Ministers having sole responsibility for approving or rejecting those
proposals, made for relatively efficient decision making – though at considerable cost in
terms of good governance. Exclusive competence is granted to the Union in very few
areas of EU policy making, including monetary policy within the Euro zone, common
commercial policy, customs union and the conservation of marine biological resources
under a common fisheries policy inter alia. Even among such strange bedfellows there
is a compelling logic to the original choice of fisheries in circumstances where the
resources of the regional seas are shared between several competing member states. A
coherent approach to their management is essential. Adoption of the Lisbon Treaty
(2007), confirming the Union's exclusive competence but agreeing to a sharing of
responsibility for approving the Commission's policy proposals between the Council
and the European Parliament, runs the risk of creating the worst of all possible worlds
where centralised policy making is allied with lengthy and less efficient decision
making.
Throughout the period of enlargement and increasing complexity of policy making, the
CFP has remained remarkably faithful to its initial premise that management of fisheries
should be based on output controls (TACs and quota). The very persistence of the man-
agement model, underpinned by aquis communautaire – the body of existing EU law that
new entrants to the Union must implement – and the principle of relative stability (see
below), made it easier for existing member states to embrace expansion without fears that
their own positions would be undermined. There was, however, a growing sense among
member states that the division of responsibility over fisheries policy was leading to an in-
creasing loss of control over their own fisheries. To posit that the European institutions
hold sway over policy formulation while member states are left with the task of implemen-
tation is an oversimplification. Beyond the core issue of stock conservation, fisheries was a
shared responsibility. Member states retained control over domestic management arrange-
ments, including inshore fisheries and quota management systems whereby national quota
was allocated to individual fishing enterprises. But the scope for effective domestic man-
agement was becoming progressively squeezed by decisions relating to stock conservation
taken at the higher level.
Inertia
Attempts to reform the CFP were constrained by the continuing failure to balance
declining fishing opportunities with sufficient reductions in fishing capacity which sus-
tained the enduring crisis of overfishing and depleted resources. Decennial reviews in
1990 and 2000 generated fairly modest proposals for incremental change from the
Commission. According to Hegland and Raakjaer (2008), reform of the CFP was the
victim of path dependence. Limitations imposed by the European Treaties concerning
the governance of fisheries, combined with the principle of relative stability embedded
within the Policy and a position of stalemate within the Council of Ministers as to the
preferred direction of change, implied a deadlocked situation over fundamental reform.
By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the CFP had become the archetype of
centralised, top down management driven by reductionist science and limited in scope
to a narrow range of technical solutions. As such it was increasingly out of step with
current thinking on fisheries governance. The clearest example was the failure to match
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ments. Although the 2002 reforms had embraced the concept (CEC, 2002 Article 2.1),
the ecosystem approach has remained a latent rather than active influence on fisheries
policy, partly because of the absence of an appropriate regional framework in which to
operate. It was left to other related areas of marine management (Integrated Maritime
Policy and Marine Strategy Framework Directive) to provide a wake-up call for fisheries
policy. More fundamentally, the reformulation of issues concerning fisheries and coastal
management as 'wicked problems' (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee, 2009), the elaboration of
the theory and practice of interactive governance (Kooiman et al, 2005) and develop-
ment of resilience theory as a basis for reconstructing the stewardship of natural
resources (Berkes, 2010), all called into question the survival of centralised management
systems like the CFP.
It was becoming increasingly clear that the EU common pond had grown too large to
be managed by central edict; that the monolithic structures of decision making were un-
suited to managing the diversity and sensitivity of marine ecosystems; and that the CFP
was perceived by its client population as remote, insensitive, irrelevant and unworkable.
In short, failure to adapt to pressures for change meant that the CFP had not only sacri-
ficed the commitment and willing compliance of the fishermen that it was intended to
serve but also its legitimacy in the eyes of the wider public concerned for the future well
being of their marine inheritance.
Regionalisation: a reluctant reform?
The early years
With regionalisation coming to prominence only quite recently, it is easy to overlook
the extent to which regional interests influenced key elements of the CFP in its forma-
tive years. During negotiations leading to Council Regulation 170/83 which established
the Community system for the conservation and management of fishery resources, the
newer 'fish rich' member states won several important concessions.
The most remarkable was a quota allocation system based on 'relative stability'. By
creating permanent allocation keys for the seven principal species, based on a formula
combining historic track records, compensation for loss of access to distant water
grounds and higher levels of fisheries dependence along the EU's north western periph-
ery (Wise, 1984), the negotiations sought to achieve a measure of relative stability
among the fishing nations. What was originally a simple expedient to allay fears that a
common policy might impact unfavourably on established fishing industries, relative
stability was to assume the guise of a principle far superior to that of equal access and
become a stumbling block to fundamental reforms of the CFP in the years ahead. It was
further underpinned by confirmation of arrangements under the UK's Treaty of Acces-
sion 1973 for exclusive national fishing rights in the zero-six nautical miles fishing zone
with an extension to twelve nautical miles in areas more dependent on fishing.
Early sensitivity to regional concerns clearly had more to do with fisheries dependence
than with managing the resource. A more blatant example of regional preference was the
designation of the Shetland Box in the northern North Sea. Preferential access was granted
to 'local' fishermen through restricted licensing of demersal vessels over twenty-six metres
ostensibly to protect 'species of special importance . . . which are biologically sensitive
because of their exploitation characteristics' (Council Regulation 170/83, Article 6).
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evils of the latter may be multiplied in the former. For the next twenty years the EU
was to forsake its apparent concern for economic and social impacts of fishing policy
on fisheries dependent areas. Instead attention was directed to ensuring that the basic
objectives of the CFP were embraced by a succession of new member states and a har-
monised system of management was rolled out across the expanding common pond
together with the fine tuning of output controls.
Elsewhere regional management systems were beginning to emerge. On a macroregio-
nal level, NEAFC was established in 1959 to recommend annual TACs and other con-
servation measures to the fourteen signatory states. After 1982, it became more closely
associated with the management of fisheries in waters beyond the EEZs and with highly
migratory stocks such as herring and mackerel. The contagious spread of EEZs created
particularly extensive fishing zones for countries like Canada, USA, Australia and New
Zealand, all of which developed their own forms of regional management, with the
USA's eight Regional Fisheries Councils established in 1979 probably the most compre-
hensive. Canada, the USA and Australia shared broadly similar characteristics: large
exclusive fishing zones extending into different oceans; diverse mainly underexploited
fisheries; and a federal system of government – all very different conditions to those
experienced in Europe.
Examples of regional management occurred in Europe including the General Fisheries
Council for the Mediterranean (1949) which provided the main institutional framework
for cooperation among the twenty Mediterranean countries (Breuil, 1999) and the Inter-
national Baltic Sea Fisheries Council (1973) responsible for deciding annual TACs and
allocating quota among the nine Baltic coastal states (Rasmussen, 1998). At a more
local level, devolved arrangements for inshore fisheries management existed in several
EU member states, most notably in the UK, France and Spain (Symes et al, 2003).
Tentative steps
Not until the mid 1990s was serious consideration given to a radical reform of the CFP.
The Commission's review of the CFP in 1991 had made reference to possible roles for
subsidiarity, co-management and regionalisation in restructuring fisheries policy (CEC,
1991). In the event, the 1992 reform did little more than confirm the existing objectives,
instruments and procedures. It was as if there was a conspiracy of inaction in the face
of depleted stocks, diminishing returns and reduced employment for fear that reform of
the CFP might threaten its disintegration. As Holden (1994) observed, the CFP was
proving to be a political success but a biological failure.
By the late 1990s, clear dividing lines were beginning to emerge between those who
favoured a minimalist approach reaffirming the status quo and those who argued for
radical reform involving either increased centralisation of decision making or decentral-
isation in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity outlined in Article 3b of the
Maastricht Treaty 1992. For those supporting further centralisation, Fraga Estevez
(1999) outlined proposals for ending derogations from the equal access principle and a
centrally administered system of individual transferable quota to replace the national
quota system, effectively creating a single European fleet.
Devolutionists were divided between those calling for a repatriation of decision making
to the member state in the form of coastal state management (Deas, 1999) and those
Symes Maritime Studies 2012, 11:6 Page 9 of 21
http://www.maritimestudiesjournal.com/content/11/1/6advocating regionalisation of the CFP. The case for regionalisation had been presented to
the Commission in January 1996 through an EU funded AIR project on Devolved and Re-
gional Management Systems for Fisheries (Symes, 1996) and disseminated more widely in
publications by Symes (1998, 1999, 2000a inter alia). Weaknesses in the current system
could be addressed through devolved management by interweaving the benefits of subsidi-
arity, stakeholder participation and regionalisation while avoiding the risk of renationalis-
ing fisheries policy. Accordingly it was suggested that Regional Fisheries Councils be given
the responsibility and authority to make recommendations to the Commission on all
aspects of fisheries management – resource conservation, fleet management and market
regulation – within each of the regional seas. Membership of the Councils would include
all member states with established fishing rights in the given regions and have a broad
representational base (administration, science and stakeholder interests).
Broadly similar solutions were put forward by the UK Ministerial Review Group in
1996 for Regional Consultative Councils and in a joint policy statement from the UK's
two fishermen's federations on Zonal Management: a new Vision for Europe's Fisheries
(2000), though the latter's vision was for executive rather than advisory councils. The
North Sea Commission, a voluntary association of local authorities from around the
North Sea basin formed in 1989 to coordinate and articulate regional fisheries interests,
also lent its support to the idea of regional management. The UK administrations, how-
ever, remained sceptical of anything more ambitious than ad hoc regional workshops
(Symes, 2000b) and beyond the UK active support for regionalisation was at best muted.
In general, those member states anxious to gain access to more resources to offset the
loss of fishing opportunities in non-EU waters or to satisfy the ambitions of more cor-
porately organised fishing industries argued for the centralisation of decision making
and a more open market in fishing rights. By contrast, those member states seeking a
better balance of fishing opportunities for their domestic fleets within the existing
framework of resource availability supported decentralised management. Both groups
were, in their own ways, looking to protect their national interests.
Outcomes from the 2002 reform process were generally rather modest. The Commis-
sion's proposals had ultimately focused on familiar issues of resource conservation and
fishing effort rather than institutional reform (CEC, 2002). However, the new framework
Regulation (COM 2571/2002) did make provision for the creation of Regional Advisory
Councils (RACs) covering the five regional seas. With broadly based stakeholder represen-
tation, their role was to advise the Commission and member state governments on fisher-
ies matters either in response to requests from those authorities or on their own initiative.
It was, though, made clear that neither the Commission nor the member states would be
bound by opinions received from the RACs. Their influence was, therefore, limited but the
initial, albeit tentative, steps towards regionalising the CFP had been taken.
Gathering momentum
Despite only modest reforms in 2002, the seeds of regionalisation had been sown and
arguments for a more radical rethink of the CFP quickly resurfaced. Several factors con-
tributed to re-energising the debate on institutional reform: the deteriorating economic
conditions in key sectors of the fishing industry; a sense that RACs represented 'unfinished
business' and that the industry needed to take more responsibility for its own actions; and
finally, new developments in marine/maritime management occurring within the EU.
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of the fishery was becoming increasingly complicated with a layering of regulation
(quota, effort restrictions, catch composition rules). Operational difficulties were inten-
sifying and the industry was becoming ever more frustrated by a policy that not only
failed to deliver improved fishing opportunities but did so at very high economic and
social costs including a haemorrhaging of social capital in terms of jobs, skills and
knowledge (Scottish Government, 2010).
It was always likely that in their early years RACs would exhibit uneven rates of pro-
gress due largely to different levels of preparedness. It soon became apparent in the Bal-
tic and North Sea RACs in particular, where support for and experience of stakeholder
cooperation at a regional level were already strong, that RACs were capable of providing
valuable advice on a wide range of regional issues (see also Ounanion, 2012, this vol-
ume). In seeking to develop industry participation still further attention turned to the
largely untested idea of objectives led (or results based) management. Under this ap-
proach the objectives, norms and targets would be decided at EU, member state or pos-
sibly regional levels while industry would set out detailed arrangements for meeting
these criteria through annual or multi-annual fishing plans. The industry would thus as-
sume much of the burden of proof for responsible fishing (Lassen et al, 2008).
Inside the Commission there were signs of a growing recognition of the relevance of
a regional approach to marine related management issues. The makeover at DG Fisher-
ies, involving a broadening of its remit to include maritime affairs, a name change to
DG Mare and internal restructuring to position three regional directorates alongside a
single horizontal directorate dealing with policy development and coordination, pro-
vided a clear signal. More importantly, the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (2008)
and the Integrated Maritime Policy (2007) both acknowledged the need for a robust
spatial framework, based on the regional seas, in which to plan and execute key policy
objectives. Unlike fisheries where exclusive competence prevailed in the development of
conservation policy, the environmental and maritime policy areas were subject to
shared competence between the Union and member states and were dependent on co-
operation between member states.
In 2007 Mike Sissenwine and David Symes were invited by DG Mare to prepare an in-
dependent critique of the CFP as part of an internal process of reflection prior to the
third decennial review (2009–12). Among its recommendations Reflections on the Com-
mon Fisheries Policy (2007) placed an emphasis on relocating the CFP in the context of
other emerging areas of marine governance, redefining and prioritising its objectives,
and restructuring its institutional framework to capture the benefits of subsidiarity and
stakeholder participation. By contrast, in looking to combat the unsustainable outcomes
of the CFP, the Commission's own working paper on Reflections on the further reform of
the Common Fisheries Policy (2008) laid rather more stress on achieving the industry's
accountability for sustainable use of the public resource, rights based management and/
or objectives led management. It was by no means clear how far devolved decision mak-
ing and regionalisation had become part of DG Mare's received wisdom.
An enigmatic green paper
The terms of the debate on CFP reforms were set out in a Green Paper (CEC, 2009). It
was welcomed as a bold, imaginative and surprisingly radical document which focused
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chinery. In its own words it aimed to achieve 'a whole-scale and fundamental reform'
and not 'another piecemeal, incremental reform' (p 5). In shaping the debate, the Green
Paper directed attention towards what it considered to be 'the five structural failings',
together with a number of other areas of concern for the future development of fisher-
ies management in the EU (see Table 1). Of the five structural failings, two dealt with
what one can term 'repair and maintenance tasks' (fleet capacity; enforcement). The
remainder were more clearly aligned to the idea of 'doing things differently' by prioritis-
ing policy objectives, restructuring the decision making system and giving industry
more responsibility for its actions.
It was always the Commission's intention to use the Green Paper to stimulate the
broadest possible debate on the future of the CFP by highlighting key areas for consid-
eration rather than setting out a series of specific proposals. But when it came to issues
of devolved governance and regionalisation, the Green Paper was decidedly enigmatic.
Only by reading between the lines was it possible to discern the outline of a suggestion
for devolving decision making in ways that might regionalise policy making, let alone
any hint that regionalisation could become an essential vehicle for delivering a reformed
CFP. Instead, it outlined two ways in which the burden of micromanaging the fisheries
might be redistributed so as to create 'a clear hierarchy between fundamental principles
and technical implementation' (p 10). The first was through the comitology procedure in-
volving closer cooperation between the Commission, member states and the European
Parliament in preparing policy proposals. The second, which came much closer to the idea
of devolved responsibility, would mean 'relying wherever possible on specific regional
management solutions implemented by Member States subject to Community standards
and control', arguing that exclusive competence 'would not prevent implementation deci-
sions being delegated to Member States, provided they are bound by decisions onTable 1 The Green Paper on the Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy
Five structural failings
• a deep-rooted problem of fleet overcapacity
• imprecise objectives
• a decision making system that encourages a short term focus
• a framework that gives insufficient responsibility to the industry
• a lack of political will to ensure compliance by the industry
Further improvements to managing the fisheries
• differentiated fishing requires to protect small scale coastal fleets
• making the most of our fisheries (MSY)
• readdressing relative stability
• improving relations between catching and the consumer
• integrating the CFP in a broader maritime policy context
• developing the knowledge base
• improving links between public financial support and CFP objectives
• external relations
• the role of aquaculture
Note: The principal issue dealing with devolved and regionalised management is shown in bold italics; other areas where
a devolved/regional framework would assist the definition and delivery of the objectives are shown in italics.
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nalised approach, the Green Paper acknowledged that 'this delegation would need to be
organised at the level of marine regions because fish stocks and shared ecosystems cover
wide geographical areas and cannot be managed by individual Member States acting in
isolation. Member States would therefore have to work together to develop the set-up
required' (p 10–11).
Was this tiptoeing around the issue of regionalisation anything more than an attempt
on the part of the Commission not to prejudge the issue, leaving it to member states to
draw their own conclusions? Or was it a sign of intervention from above, evidence of
divided opinion within the Commission or anticipation of legal pitfalls that could lie
ahead? Whatever the reasons it was left to member state governments, the fishing in-
dustry and others to decipher the message and fill in the details of what the new deci-
sion making framework might involve.
Filling in the details
Many responses to the Green Paper appeared to assume that some form of devolved re-
gional management would form part of the overall architecture of the reformed CFP.
Each member state or stakeholder organisation had its own perception of what a
devolved CFP might look like, yet scarcely any of the responses sought to describe its
detailed structure. Similarly, several symposia held in the wake of the Green Paper's
publication attempted to piece together an image of regionalised management from
examples occurring elsewhere in the world and at varying geographical scales but with-
out paying due attention to the unique geography and political structures associated
with EU fisheries management.
Deciding the form of regionalisation would normally follow a two stage process of
first agreeing the division of management responsibilities between the central and
regional bodies, along lines similar to those shown in Table 2a, and then setting out
criteria for designing the regional organisation (Table 2b). Two unpublished studies
(Nordic Council of Ministers, 2009; Raakjaer et al, 2010) offer this more structured
approach. As the latter is considered in the following paper, only the findings from the
former will be summarised here. Suffice it to point out that both studies were based on
similar sets of governance issues and each postulates a range of alternative models
before submitting them to different forms of evaluation so as to arrive at a final selec-
tion. The results are encouragingly similar.
In his presentation to the Nordic Council symposium in October 2009, Symes
describes four alternative approaches (Table 3), distinguishing between those that ad-
here to existing decision making arrangements (in-house; dispersal) and those that re-
quire a redistribution of responsibilities between the Commission and the member
states (standing conference; reorganisation). Under scrutiny from a qualitative (and
highly subjective) assessment designed to test their abilities to deliver the Green Paper's
objectives and good governance and to meet practical considerations of costs, ease of
implementation et cetera, the first two options failed on almost all counts. In arriving at
a final choice, although option (D) would in all probability yield the optimum solution, it
was the standing conference of member state administrations (C) that won through, largely
on pragmatic reasoning and not least the question of conformity with the legal provisions
of the Treaties. This should be seen as the de minimis solution for regionalising the CFP.
Table 2 Regionalising the CFP
a) Division of responsibility
(i) The European institutions would be responsible for developing Community policy that
• sets out the principles and standards to be adhered to under a common fisheries policy;
• provides a clear statement of the biological and ecological objectives of management;
• describes a broad, long term management strategy including the setting of key reference points and long
term targets for ensuring these objectives are met;
• outlines the mechanisms by which Community policy will be monitored and evaluated.
(ii) The role of member states, acting collectively and individually, will be to implement Community policy
through:
• elaborating appropriate regional strategies for fisheries management in line with Community standards
and targets;
• developing long term recovery and management plans for all major stocks within the region;
• approving annual or multi-annual fishing plans prepared by the fishing industries;
• enacting appropriate legislation; and
• monitoring and evaluating these activities.
b) Criteria for designing a regional management organisation
The regional organisation should be designed so as to ensure the full and effective collaboration of all relevant
member states in achieving the following:
• delivery of the objectives, norms and targets set out in the Community fishing policy;
• efficient and effective use of limited scientific, human and financial resources;
• a sufficient opportunity for stakeholders to assert their knowledge, understanding and experience of the
fisheries;
• a timely response to any changing circumstances affecting the region's fisheries; and
• binding agreements among all participating member states as to the actions required.
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integration with other areas of marine management; the treatment of highly migratory
stocks and other transboundary questions; and relations with third countries, inter alia.
But the most crucial questions focus around the nature of involvement of the European
institutions, especially with the introduction of co-decision making involving the Coun-
cil of Ministers and the European Parliament, and exactly which responsibilities would
be delegated to the member states.Table 3 Alternative Models of Regionalisation (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2009)
A. The in-house solution where DG Mare remains responsible for regionalised management but the roles of
member states in shaping regionally specific measures are strengthened through the 'comitology'
procedure. The Commission and member states continue to receive expert regional advice from RACs.
B. The dispersal solution reduces the distance between the Commission and the industry by relocating DG
Mare's regional directorates within the regions to work alongside the member states' administrations, their
expert advisers and representatives of the regions' fishing industries in developing regional management
strategies. The decision making process remains unaltered, as does the role of RACs.
C. The administrative solution separates the functions of the Commission and member states by establishing
regional standing conferences of member states' administrations meeting at regular intervals to interpret and
implement Community policy without intervention from the Commission, Council of Ministers or Parliament.
RACs continue to provide essential stakeholder advice.
D. The reorganising solution requires the creation of dedicated Regional Management Organisations (RMOs) with
permanent secretariats and fixed abodes within the regions to give them a clear identity. RMOs would
supersede existing RACs; their membership would be broadened to include member state administrations
and their terms of reference widened to confer responsibility for developing regional management strategies
in line with Community policy and making binding recommendations to member states, subject to approval
by Commission, Council and Parliament.
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institutions retain the meta-governance functions of deciding the principles, objectives,
norms and overall targets of the CFP and setting out a broad strategy for their achieve-
ment. Member states would agree the detailed regional approach for implementing this
Community policy. Under variant (a), the 'upstream approach', member states having
reached agreement at the regional level submit their policy proposals through the normal
channels for co-approval by the Council and Parliament. The disadvantage of this
approach is the risk of final decision making becoming politicised and protracted. Variant
(b), the 'downstream' approach, entails a potentially more detailed set of instructions being
handed down by the European institutions, with the member states agreeing a process of
implementation without need for further approval by Council and Parliament before being
put into operation. The price is the transfer of significantly less responsibility to the mem-
ber states.
Assuming that output controls remain the cornerstone of the conservation policy, the
Commission would retain its control over determining the level of TACs, with a move
towards multi-annual TACs supplemented by harvest control rules, to avoid the disab-
ling uncertainties that accompany the present annual review. Decisions relating to long
term management plans, technical conservation measures, quota management, discard
rules and the implementation of incentive based and ecosystem based approaches to
management are best considered at the regional level and should therefore be delegated
to the member states acting together within a regional framework. Anything less would
prompt the question as to whether devolved or regional management was a prize worth
winning.
Delivering the benefits of regionalisation
For most people, the primary purpose of regionalising the CFP is to rebuild the trust in
fisheries management that has been largely dissipated over two decades of centralised,
bureaucratic decision making located in Brussels. By bringing decision making much
closer to those affected and with a more direct involvement of the stakeholders in the
formulation and implementation of policy, it is hoped to foster a greater sense of shared
ownership of the process that will enhance commitment to, and compliance with, the
regulatory system.
There are more tangible benefits to be won from regionalisation. With the framework
for fisheries management being developed at the regional level, long term management
plans can be tailored to suit specific regional circumstances, yet with sufficient flexibility
to allow for adaptive forms of management under changing ecological conditions. It
should also allow more rapid progress to be made in implementing the ecosystem based
approach in which not only is there a presumption against fishing activities that impair
the sustainability of the region's ecosystem(s) but also where increasing understanding
of ecosystem interactions is used to fine tune the use of technical conservation mea-
sures (gear regulations, minimum landing sizes, closed areas) to improve the effective-
ness of fisheries management. Regional management can also provide a more robust
framework for objectives led management in which different segments of the region's
fishing industry contribute to the detail of management through multi-annual fishing
plans designed to show how they intend to meet the targets and standards set at
regional or EU level. Further down the line, agreements at regional level could pave the
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of quota management and the integration of fisheries management with other areas of
marine policy.
Although regionalisation is to be seen as a means of delivering more effective man-
agement, it may come at a cost that some acolytes of the European project may find
disturbing. With less uniformity of regulation throughout the EU fishing zone, could
come the impression of a less level playing field that might heighten political tensions
between regions. Moreover, there can be no guarantee that regional decision making
will deliver the tangible benefits in all situations or at all times. There is always the risk
that some member states will feel intimidated by collective bargaining at the regional
level or seek to opt out of collective decisions that work to their disadvantage. However,
there is no fundamental reason to believe that the willingness and ability of stakeholders
from different member states to work together in the RACs to produce agreed solutions
to particular problems cannot be repeated in the context of regionalised governance.The denouement
With the publication in July 2011 of the Commission's formal proposals for reforming the
CFP (CEC 2011b), the EU has entered the closing stages of what many believe to be a cru-
cial phase in the policy's development. Bringing to an end the 'phoney war' over the role of
regionalisation conducted in an atmosphere of deepening uncertainty and growing concern
that the Commission's initial commitment to radical institutional change was weakening,
the focus of the debate now shifts to negotiations within and between the Council of Minis-
ters and the European Parliament in a period of co-decision making that will determine the
details of the new basic regulation governing the conduct of the CFP up to 2022.
What is already clear is that the 'fundamental and whole-scale reform' anticipated in
the Green Paper is unlikely to materialise, with the move towards regionalising the CFP
a likely casualty. Specific reasons for this apparent volte face are open to conjecture,
though some elements of the case against regionalisation are more easily discernible.
What is less clear are the likely outcomes from the process of co-decision, the extent to
which the European Parliament or Council of Ministers will seek to change the em-
phasis of the CFP – either in the present form or as envisaged in the Commission's pro-
posals – and the long term implications for the future of the CFP.
The Commission's proposals
Taken at face value, the Commission's proposalsc appear as a pale shadow of the initial
aspirations set out in the Green Paper in 2009. But there is a remarkable and puzzling
discrepancy between the Commission's Communication (CEC 2011a) explaining the
overall package of reform and the actual draft regulation that translates the intentions
into specific proposals couched in more austere legal terminology.
The Communication puts a decidedly positive spin on the intentions and, in a style
reminiscent of the Green Paper, argues that 'The Commission proposes an agenda that
is ambitious as regards regionalisation and simplification. EU fisheries legislation
adopted centrally should focus on objectives, targets, minimum common standards and
results, and delivery timeframes. While key decisions remain at EU level, Member States
will have the flexibility to decide on other measures for fisheries management, under
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2011a, p 7).
The draft regulation, on the other hand, sets out more precisely the framework for the
conduct of EU fisheries policies over the next decade. It covers a wide ranging agenda,
including not only proposals for the conservation of marine biological resources – the spe-
cific area of policy for which the Union is granted exclusive competence – but also matters
relating to access to resources, management of fishing capacity, control and enforcement,
aquaculture and external policy inter alia. In style, it presents only an outline of the Com-
mission's future intentions, containing little by way of explanation for, or detail of, the
measures proposed. Many of the proposals presented in outline will become the subject of
more detailed secondary legislation.
Under the heading of 'conservation of biological resources', the proposed actions are
divided into Union measures, regionalisation and national measures very much in line
with the anticipated division of responsibility for decision making between central, re-
gional and national levels of authority – and in that sense the draft regulation maintains
the promise of greater delegation of powers. In practice, however, it appears that the
intention is for the Commission to retain control over the content of multi-annual plans
– the key instrument of conservation management – including setting the objectives,
framing the technical measures to achieve MSY, mitigation of environmental impacts
and reduction of discards, thus leaving very little scope for meaningful delegated re-
sponsibility. Under the heading of regionalisation it acknowledges that 'Member States
may be authorised to adopt [additional] measures in accordance with multi-annual
plans which specify the conservation measures for vessels flying their flag' (Article
17,1). Not only is the draft regulation stripped bare of all reference to substantive pro-
posals for how the so-called 'regionalisation' might be developed but even a simple
reference to member states cooperating at fishery level to ensure compatibility of
actions, appearing in an earlier draft, has been removed.
Regionalisation is not the only casualty. From the Green Paper's checklist of improve-
ments to the existing policy, there is no clarification of the CFP's objectives, no indica-
tion of the greater involvement of the fishing industry, no suggestions as to how a
proactive ecosystem based approach to management might be developed and no clear
signals as to how the new regulation will assist the integration of fisheries, marine envir-
onmental management and maritime policies. One of the few survivors from the check-
list is the introduction of rights based management at the national level in the form of
'transferable fishing concessions'. Rather than ease the burden of micromanagement
through effective decentralisation of decision making, the reform package appears to
consolidate the Commission's powers and to remove the member state's right to deter-
mine its own system of quota management.
The contrasts between the rhetoric of the Commission's Communication and the
realities of the draft regulation are stark and difficult to reconcile. While the Communi-
cation appears to signal that a path has been cleared for member states to cooperate at
a regional level in pursuit of sustainable resource management, the draft regulation has
removed all the signposts. Opportunities for the delegation of decision making responsi-
bilities – the key to decentralisation and simplification of the regulatory system – are
severely limited, apparently confined to member states acting individually rather than
collectively and subject to default action by the Commission.
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Explanations for an apparently bi-polar presentation of the Commission's proposals for
reform are difficult to find. The uncompromising nature of the draft regulation is pos-
sibly the easier to explain by reference to the likely intervention of the Commission's
legal services on 'constitutional' issues. It has long been recognised that fundamental
reform of the CFP's institutional framework would encounter major obstacles arising
from the apparent immutability of the European Treaties. Three interrelated issues lie
at the heart of the legal challenge: the threat to the exclusive competence of the Union;
the extent to which the powers of the European institutions can be delegated to mem-
ber states; and the failure of the Treaties to recognise regions or regional organisations
as competent authorities in formulating or implementing Community policy. Initially,
DG Mare sought to get round these problems by a) redefining the boundaries between
formulating and implementing conservation policy; b) proposing to delegate certain,
unspecified responsibilities to member states under the guise of implementation tasks;
and c) insisting that these delegated responsibilities could only be properly discharged
by the member states acting in collaboration with their regional neighbours (Commis-
sion, 2009: 10–11).
In looking to give form and structure to this approach without contravening the
established constitutional rules, the low key option of a standing conference of member
states described earlier in this paper appeared to answer the legal objections. The stand-
ing conference makes no pretence of having a separate legal identity. It is simply an ex-
tension of the administrative arm of the member states that make up its membership. It
makes no claim to any form of autonomy in recommending, enacting or implementing
fisheries policy and therefore poses no threat, legal or otherwise, to the present struc-
tures of decision making at either the European or member state levels. The Commis-
sion's legal advisers, however, appear to have taken the view that any substantive
expression of regionalisation is contrary to the provisions of the Treaties and poses a
potential threat to the Union's authority in matters relating to fisheries policy.
Seeking explanations: 2. political opportunities
The persistence of a bullish portrayal of the reform agenda in the face of the somewhat
emasculated set of proposals in the draft regulation is, by contrast, more baffling. The
gradual leaking of the contents of the draft regulation served its purpose by defusing
any element of surprise and dissipating some of the anger at the apparent lack of pro-
gress in reforming the CFP. Member state representatives and industry leaders gave a
cautious welcome to the promise of a more decentralised decision making but were
bemused by the lack of detail on key issues, including regionalisation. They were also
somewhat surprised by the Director General's assertion that CFP reform remains wide
open (Fishing News, 2011) intimating that the final package of reform will be heavily
influenced by the positions taken by member states within the Council of Ministers and
by elected representatives in the European Parliament. Will either or both parties have
the appetite for such a challenge and can they find the means of reaching an agreement
on reinvigorating the reform process?
Both parties will first need to establish their own positions before attempting to reach
common ground through co-decision. Member states clearly have different interests,
priorities and ambitions for a reformed CFP. Within the Council, three issues will help
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form of the CFP; their alignments on particular issues; and the extent to which a final
position can be achieved through mutual agreement or a compromise between conflict-
ing opinions.
As on previous occasions, some member states will be unwilling to embrace the need
for major change. In some cases this will have little to do with fisheries per se but a con-
cern to avoid the risk of undermining the broader status quo. This group will probably
include a number of prominent players on the larger stage of EU politics as well as
many small countries with little or no direct interest in marine fisheries. The two main
protagonists are likely to be Spain and the UK, each leading campaigns for major
reform but in significantly different directions, with Spain arguing for more open com-
petition in access to fishing rights across Europe and the UK favouring less central
control and more delegated responsibility. How other member states will finally co-
alesce around these two positions and the question of regionalisation is unknown. So
too is the prospect of repeating the polarisation of opinion between northern and
southern Europe that did much to neutralise the 2002 reforms (Hegland and Raakjaer,
2008).
The fault lines of opinion on fisheries issues within the European Parliament are
much more difficult to discern. Potentially the most controversial political issue is the
proposal to compel member states to introduce systems of rights based management in
the form of transferable fishing concessions. Such a proposal will cause deep divisions
both within and between member states and, in the context of the European Parlia-
ment, between different political factions. The issue of regionalisation is less likely to
stir the emotions, and precisely how the large numbers of MEPs – the majority of
whom have no constituency interest in fisheries – will be persuaded to form an opinion
is unclear. It will be largely down to the Parliament's Fisheries Committee to provide a
clear lead, though membership of the committee will itself be exercised by conflicting
opinions.
In the context of fisheries, co-decision is unknown territory. This will be the first
major occasion when the European Parliament is called upon to exert its influence over
fisheries policy as a result of powers granted to it under the Treaty of Lisbon. Whether
Parliament as a whole will choose to flex its muscle and take issue with the Commis-
sion's proposals (or with the opinions of the Council of Ministers) is also at this stage
unclear. The risks of co-decision surround the nature of political compromise where
some worthy causes may be sacrificed in pursuit of particular ambitions. Where com-
promise is involved a further blunting of the edge of radical reform seems inevitable.
So, while in the final political process CFP reform remains quite literally wide open, at
this stage nothing can be guaranteed.
What of the future?
If, as seems likely, the Commission's proposals for modifying the present decision mak-
ing process fall short of a genuine regionalisation of the CFP, the issue is unlikely to go
away. Regionalising the CFP is intended not as an end in itself but a means of delivering
better, customised and more effective fisheries management. The failure to create a
robust regional framework for fisheries management will cause collateral damage to
other areas of policy reform. It will require creative thinking within DG Mare to ensure
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the outmoded command and control policy making that has largely failed to guarantee
sustainable fisheries.
But does one need a new basic regulation enshrining the principles of devolved and
regionalised fisheries management in order to promote greater sensitivity towards regional
differences that characterise the EU's fishing zone and ensure a more regionally integrated
approach to managing the living resource of the seas around Europe? Perhaps not, though
it would be by far the most sensible way of doing things. The scope for formal action
within the 'new' basic framework is limited. The Commission might choose to deploy the
comitology procedure involving close collaboration with the European Parliament and
relevant member states in developing the multi-annual plans and technical frameworks for
particular fisheries to ensure greater regional specificity. The Commission (CEC 2011a)
has also promised to extend the role of the RACs (now reduced in name to Advisory
Councils), though in what direction is not yet clear. What really matters, however, is
whether the Commission is prepared to give greater weight to the advice received and to
act upon the Advisory Councils' recommendations.
Alternative action, outwith the framework of the new regulation, could come
through a strengthening of regional stakeholder organisations to pressure member
state governments on issues of regional importance; these could work effectively in
areas like the semi-enclosed Baltic and North Seas. Or it might be that other policy
areas more in touch with public opinion – marine environmental management, for
example – will be able to persuade fisheries managers to adopt a more openly regional
approach. On the other hand, it may require a further decade of centralised micro-
management, doing little to remedy the underlying problems of the current approach,
to force a further review of the issue in 2022. Despite the legal setbacks, regionalising
the CFP clearly remains a work in progress.Conclusions
This paper has traced the evolution of regionalisation from an academic concept to a
realistic objective in the context of EU fisheries management and a substantive project
for the 2012 reform. It ends on a note of frustration, no doubt shared by many in DG
Mare, that regionalising the CFP will be decided on legal and procedural grounds rather
than from a perspective of good governance and what is best for the fisheries. On the
positive side, the latest review of the CFP suggests widespread, though not universal, ap-
proval among member states for the decentralisation of decision making in the imple-
mentation of policy together with significant levels of support for regionalisation, more
especially in northern Europe. But this must be set against the continuing weakness of
fisheries as an issue within the wider political arena and the need to safeguard the au-
thority of the European institutions that evidently lack the tensile strengths of a federal
system of government.
Many of the problems facing fisheries management in the EU can only be addressed
fully at the level of the individual fishery and with the direct involvement of the relevant
member states and their fishing industries, working together in a regional framework.
The means of achieving this collaboration must be clear, robust and transparent. It must
not be allowed to fail for lack of an explicit form and a tangible structure.
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a Although in principle the aims and objectives of the CFP apply to all fishing activities
undertaken within the EU fishing zone, fisheries policy has been largely driven by north
European and Atlantic fishing interests. In practice, therefore, the basic regulatory system
adopted by the CFP, involving total allowable catches (TACs) and catch quota, has applied
only to fisheries in the north east Atlantic and its tributary seas. Fisheries management in
the Mediterranean, based mainly on technical measures, has been conducted through the
General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean, of which the EU is a member.
b Following the inauguration of the European Community in 1964 involving Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, there were six subsequent
enlargements: in 1972 (Denmark, Ireland and the UK); 1981 (Greece); 1987 (Portugal
and Spain); 1996 (Austria, Finland, Sweden); 2002 (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia); and 2007 (Bulgaria
and Romania). The significance of the final enlargement was the extension of the CFP
into the Black Sea.
c The Commission's proposals for reform of the CFP are set out in three key docu-
ments: a Communication to the European Parliament, the Council the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (CEC, 2011a), setting
out the overall intentions, together with two legislative proposals – the first for reform
of the CFP (CEC, 2011b) and the second for the common organisation of the markets
in fishery and aquaculture products (CEC, 2011c). The latter includes the objectives and
functions of the Producer Organisations which play an important role in the implementa-
tion of the CFP through the planning and marketing off their members' catches.
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